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REFLECTIONS ON CONSCIENCE
AND AUTHORITY'
MOST REVEREND JOHN J. WRIGHT*

of reflections on conscience and authority,
I would confine myself to the discussion of these powerful and
sometimes conflicting moral forces as they operate within the Holy
Catholic Church.
I would do so aware, of course, that conscience and authority are
also at work and in conflict in the general society, in the family, in
professional life, in the university world-wherever there are persons
in societies of whatever kind or origin. I realize, moreover, that the
most bitter arena of conflict between conscience and authority in our
century is probably the modern State which, in all its forms, tends to
be characterized by a certain absolutism which creates grave problems
for even the natural conscience but tormenting antagonisms for the
consciences of those who believe in a supernatural order transcending
and subordinating the claims of secular authority.
I would write of the concepts of conscience and of authority within
the Church, however, because when these concepts and their mutual
relations within the Church are clear, when a Christian conscience is
soundly formed, a model is proposed for all other societies and Christians are the better prepared personally to face up to parallel tensions
elsewhere and socially to contribute to the easing of these in their other
forms and areas of conflict.
I would note carefully, in thus limiting my discussion to the Church,
that Pope Pius XI could, and did, distinguish sharply between the
spirit of authority in the Church and the spirit of "authoritarianism."
I would recall his careful distinction between the structure of authority
in the Church and that in totalitarian regimes, insisting, as did he,
that these latter "can claim no point of resemblance to hierarchical
constitutions of the Church," precisely because of the respective attitudes of these and of the Church toward "the clear and incontrovertible
dictates of conscience," "the laws of individual and social living written
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t Reprinted from the April/May 1964 issue of THE CRITIC @ 1964 by the Thomas
More Association, 180 N. Wabash Ave., Chicago, 111. 60601.
* D.D. Bishop of Pittsburgh.

12
in the hearts of men" and "the freedom
and improvement of the human person."'
I would probably develop this point at
some length, having in mind the confusions in its regard, confusions always
wide-spread but now intensified by writers
like Mr. Paul Blanshard. I would seek to
bring to the American reader some of the
reflections of their European Catholic
brethren on the supremely important point
made by the Auxiliary Bishop of Rouen
at a 1961 Anglo-French symposium on
problems of authority in the Church:
the hierarchical government of the Church
will always be radically different in its
innermost nature and in its visible manifestations from the hierarchical government of a human society of secular type.
It is only to the extent that sin corrupts
the hierarchy by depriving it of the Godgiven sense of its organic function in the
Church, and developing in it a 'will to
power' that knows no limit and has no
religious purpose, that the Church becomes that 'huge sociological beast' which
used to terrify Simone Weil (and many
others in good faith after and before her
time). 2
Jean Cadet, more positively, emphasizes how the use of pastoral authority in
the Church is necessarily different from
the use of authority in any secular society,
since justice, at best, is the object of
secular authority, whereas the whole jurisdictional order of the Church must be
the servant of love. This is a point which
I would hope to develop greatly in my
book; I mention it now because it cannot
be too soon emphasized in any discussion
of conscience and authority, or of anything else within the Church.
1Address by Pope Pius XII to the Roman Rota,
October 2, 1945.
2Pailler, Considerations on

the Authority of

the Church, in PROBLEMS OF AUTHORITY 23.
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My first chapter would have to include
a pointed explanation of one reason why
there is so much seemingly tentative and
even hesitant talk about the relations
between conscience and authority. In fact,
the problem is relatively modern in time
and not even now universal in its geography, the contemporary statement of
the problem of conscience being linked to
recent and regional claims with respect
to the sovereign independence of the individual person. In clarifying the implications of this fact, I would depend heavily
on Jacques Leclercq who contends that
citizens of the Western world suffer from
a certain optical illusion when they adjudge the sovereign independence of the
individual person to be one of the major
themes of human literature, political,
moral and other. :On the contrary, this
theme, including its statement in terms
of conscience, is even now almost confined to Western Europe, North America,
Great Britain, plus some contiguous and
scattered zones influenced by ideas transplanted from these.
In the Western world, however, the
theme of the supremacy of conscience, in
a valid sense and also with some exaggerations, Leclercq can compare to a steadily
expanding river, flooding in all directions;
it has become an idle fixe, a master
theme, perhaps, the master theme of
Western civilization. People have become
accustomed to link, somewhat over-simply,
its origins to controversies arising out of
sixteenth century religious and political
disputes. However, as in the case of so
many great ideas, it is possible to dig up
from the more distant past precursor statements at least of the problem surrounding
the idea. Those who read history per-

CONSCIENCE AND AUTHORITY

suaded that there is nothing new under
the sun-or that, as Marie Antoinette's
milliner put it, there is never anything
new except what has been forgottenfind some earlier affirmations of the supremacy of conscience in Greco-Roman
antiquity (drama, philosophy and eloquence) and even in the literature and
ethic of the Far East.
Whatever of this, the theme of the sovereignty of conscience, validly stated and
otherwise, like that of the supremacy of
the person has chiefly developed in Western Europe and in relatively modern
times. The controversy passed from the
religious to the political arena in the seventeenth century, probably reaching its first
high political plateau with the French concepts of the Rights of Man in the eighteenth century and pressing forward thereafter in politico-social movements inspired
by the idea of liberty, above all personal
liberty, and thus becoming associated with
movements and points of view that came
to be called "liberal."
The orderly development of my subject
would require that my second chapter
concern itself, perhaps, with the history
of the concept of conscience. This could
be a book all by itself; indeed, many
books have already been written on the
concept of conscience in different times
and places, even on the great changes in
the concept of conscience within the Christian tradition from New Testament days
down to our own times. I would, point
out that conscience is one of those words
which everyone uses readily enough and
which most think of as not only basic
but also very simple, though an invitation
to define it usually reveals confusion and
embarrassment. Fortunately, it is more

easy and, indeed, better to have a good
conscience than it is to define one, as
Thomas A Kempis pointed out about compunction. People can feel very strongly
about conscience and be quite fierce in
asserting its claims, while being little prepared to say what it is, even though, as
they might point out, "everyone knows
what it is." It is something like a spiral;
everyone knows what a spiral is, but when
pressed for a definition, most helplessly
wiggle their fingers in the air.
In seeking to define conscience, some
do so in inspirational terms, like those
which little George Washington used when
he wrote in his copy book, "labor to keep
alive in your breast that little spark of
celestial fire-conscience."
Others still
speak in the more negative terms of the
so-called "accusing conscience," that stern,
tormenting voice that only speaks to you
when you have done something wrong
and which many suppose to be the only
true sense of conscience. This, I think,
is what people usually mean when they
use phrases like "a New England conscience," which, under study, often means
the guilty recognition that you have spent
too much money or that you are likely to
be found out in some indiscretion and
thus find your name in the paper, or,
what is worse, to have forfeited your
credit in the local bank.
This chapter could be extremely long
and singularly boring except to those interested in semantics or the historical development of philosophical concepts. And
so, I would simply invoke some dictionary
definitions which seem to do justice to the
general concept of conscience and would
then throw in some bibliographical references to more precise definitions and
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hasten on to the more imaginative considerations which stimulate me most.
Most would probably settle for the
definition in the Century Dictionary; published in the period 1889-1911, it reflects
the notion that is probably uppermost in
mind among those who speak of conscience with positive commitment still.
For it, moral conscience is
the consciousness that the acts for which
a person believes himself to be responsible
do or do not conform to his ideal of
right; the moral judgment of the individual applied to his own conduct, in
distinction from his perception of right
and wrong in the abstract, and in the
conduct of others. It manifests itself in
the feeling of obligation or duty, the
moral imperative 'I ought' or 'I ought
not'; hence the phrases the 'voice of conscience,' the 'dictates of conscience,' and
the like.
This dictionary definition reflects a
heavily individualistic concept basically
consistent with the personal element present from the beginning in the Christian
doctrine concerning the idea of conscience
but adding a certain exclusiveness and
debatable autonomy, with overtones discordant to the Christian ear, from postReformation, Renaissance and Enlightenment times. Nonetheless, it is a working
definition for our purposes, as are also
some of the descriptions of conscience
with which Victorian philosophical literature abounds. A good example is that by
Sir William Hamilton, the nineteenth century Scottish philosopher (not to be confused with the husband of Lord Nelson's
mistress, they having the same name,
over-lapping dates but somewhat different
preoccupations) :
Man, as conscious of his liberty to act,
and of the law by which his actions ought

CATHOLIC

LAWYER,

WINTER

1966

to be regulated, recognizes his personal
accountability, and calls himself before the
internal tribunal which we denominate
conscience. Here he is either acquitted
or condemned. The acquittal is connected
with a peculiar feeling of pleasurable exultation, as the condemnation with a peculiar feeling of painful humiliation-remorse.
Such definitions or descriptions leave
us with several unsolved problems to
which we shall have to devote later chapters of our book. The first is the problem
of the relationship of the dictates of internal conscience, so understood, to the
demands of external authority, the heart
of our present reflections. Another is
that of how and whence such a conscience
derives its knowledge of the law by which
its actions are to be regulated; in a word,
how is such a conscience formed or illumined? What norms, other than its own
ipse dixit, does it have?
On this latter point my second chapter
will have to evaluate many different speculations. Protestant Christian theories include explanations often bound up with
illuminatism or even direct divine inspiration, if not revelation; others, more often
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
relate (as did Sir William Hamilton and
the even greater Sir William Blackstone)
the concept and function of conscience
to the concept of Natural Law, a source
of knowledge of God's will which a solid
Protestant tradition once exalted much
higher than does any Catholic doctrine of
Natural Law, since the interpretation of
the demands and sanctions of Natural Law
for Catholics has always been within the
context of the mind or understanding of
the Church where revelation serves to
illumine, to purify and to warm areas of
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Natural Law which are otherwise obscure,
harsh or unduly rigorous.
For the development of the Catholic
Christian understanding of the concept
and range of conscience, I would refer my
gentle reader to a standard treatise in
moral theology. The choices are many,
but for the purposes of my book, which
I would seek to relate to contemporary
problems and to infuse with the spirit in
which these problems can best be met, I
would suggest the first volume of Father
Bernard Hiring's Moral Theology for
Priests and Laity entitled The Law of
Christ. There my reader will find a more
than adequate survey of the concepts of
conscience from the pre-Christian days
of Epictetus, Seneca, the Stoics, Chrysippus and Ovid (whose definition of conscience as "God-in-us" is a remote ancestor of little George Washington's copybook phrase) through the Sacred Scriptures (which are eloquent on the power
of conscience but not entirely clear on
the definition of its nature) to the development of moral conscience in Patristic
writings (especially St. Augustine and St.
Jerome) and the great scholastic philosophers and theologians.
These latter, Father Haring will point
out, offer diverse theories regarding the
nature of conscience, while agreeing on its
claims and its power. The theories of
Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas
are intellectualistic, those of Alexander of
Hales and Bonaventure are voluntaristic.
Both are consistent with Father Haring's
own contention, typically Catholic as distinct from "direct voice of God" concepts
of conscience, that God is indeed at work
in the depths of conscience, at work as a
person "who calls and invites, a judge,

living, absolute, the source of the summons
and the law," but that we ourselves contribute, out of our natures something
which must be trained to play its part in
the decisions of conscience. Even if we
Catholics do not acknowledge the dictate
of conscience as being the direct voice of
God, as some others tend to do, we do
speak of conscience as including somehow
the voice of God. "It is the voice of God,
but in the sense that we must contribute
something of our own in the formation of
the decision of a conscience which is right
in God's sight. Error is possible in our
decision, but we are able to trace it to its
source." That source, and it operates
commonly, is in ourselves, not God, and
it is, of course, the presence and perils
of it which so complicate the discussion
of conscience itself and its relations with
authority.
This is particularly true, as my chapter
will point out, when there is talk of the
freedom of conscience as that further concept is debated in our day. The fact is
that, contrary to a general but loose impression, conscience binds far more than
it loosens. Conscience is not something
by which I am set free from obligations
so much as it is something by which I am
bound, controlled and on occasions sternly
rebuked. It is necessary to get this unpleasant fact (if it is unpleasant) in clear
focus at the outset of any discussion of
conscience. This is, of course, what befogs
much discussion, outside the Ecumenical
Council, of the progress of the debate on
religious liberty as an aspect of freedom
of conscience; it also makes extremely
delicate the debate on freedom of conscience in the Council itself.
Bishop De Smedt, whose magnificent
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address introducing the initial draft on
religious liberty was universally applauded
at the Council, was painfully aware of the
widespread confusion on his point not
only among possible critics of his position
but also among some who have no idea
what he is talking about and might, in
fact, reject it if they did, but claim him
as their champion.
Hence, De Smedt could not safely as
an honest Christian nor prudently as a
competent debater leave his case on the
apodictic assertion of Pope John, namely:
."Every human being has the right to
honor God according to the dictates of an
upright conscience, and therefore the
right to worship God privately and publicly. . . ."13 He is obligated to shoot at
enemies from half a dozen directions,
those who wish to scuttle his ship and
who clamber over its prow in the honest
effort to sink it, and those who are scampering aboard in the aft section and all
around the sides in an effort to sail it into
harbors for which De Smedt is not destined and of which he wants .no part.
And so, he was obliged to devote whole
sections of his Council speech to explaining what he is not talking about, since
what he is talking about is highly mysterious to a generation which talks passionately of conscience, but often to the
confusion of the cause.
Accordingly, my chapter on conscience
will quote at length from Bishop De
Smedt's speech to the Council, beginning
with the section in which he says:
When religious liberty is defended, it is
not asserted that it is proper for man
to consider the religious problem accord3 Encyclical

Letter of John XXIII, Pacem in
Terris (1963).
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ing to his own whim without any moral
obligation and decide for himself according to his own will whether or not to
embrace religion (religious indifferentism).
Nor is it affirmed that the human conscience is free in the sense that it is, as
it were, outside the law, absolved from
any obligation toward it (laicism).
Nor is it said that falsehood is to be
considered on an equal footing with truth,
as though there were no objective norm
of truth (doctrinal relativism).
Nor is it admitted that man in any way
has a quasi-right to maintain a peaceful
complacency in the midst of uncertainty
4
(dilettantistic pessimism).
Then I shall return to the Century Dictionary definition, adding a word or two
about the positive claims of conscience as
these are set forth in St. Thomas Aquinas
and in a very brief but. very forceful phrase
of the Fourth Lateran. The Lateran Council said that anyone who acts against
conscience, acts so to his damnation. St.
Thomas specifically relates the possibility
of damnation to the, relations between the
dictates of conscience and those of authority when there may be conflict between
the two. He does so in many passages,
one of which will suffice:
Therefore conscience is more to be obeyed
than authority imposed from outside. For
conscience obliges in virtue of divine command, whether written down in a code
or instilled by natural law'. To weigh
conscience in the scales against obedience
to legal authority is to compare the
weight of divine and of human decrees.
The first obliges mbre than the second,
and sometimes against the second.

•Address of Bishop Emile De Smedt, introducing the draft on religious liberty at Vatican
Council It. For a fuller treatment of this matter see the eventual Council Declaration on
Religious Liberty.
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Wherefore, my next chapter must, obviously, concern itself with the concept of
authority. I shall be the more eager to
write this chapter because the concept of
authority in the Church, like that of conscience, involves difficulties which are
everywhere encountered in the contemporary ecumenical dialogue. Moreover,
the concept and fact of authority are not
merely widely discussed at the moment;
they are also universally threatened. Within the family, within political society, in
the world of teaching and philosophy, in
the realm of morals and religion, authority
is of all concepts the least popular. On
the decline in the prestige of authority
and in the recognition of the constructive
and noble elements of the virtue of obedience, another whole book could be written. I think it unlikely that any editor
will be clamoring for it nowadays and I
gravely fear that, given the zeitgeist, the
Thomas More Society will not confer a
medal on the man who writes it.
However, a plain, blunt man, I shall
spell out some basic truths about authority, relying once again on the doctors
of morals, dogma and laws utriusque to
point out the premises and develop the
corollaries of the Christian and human
case for authority. I shall be grateful, of
course, if the Ecumenical Council, plus
the literature surrounding it, so speaks
about the nature, limits and claims of
authority as to make these more persuasive to fallen and capricious human nature,
always allergic to authority, particularly
in an age of democracy and in the land
of youth and freedom beyond the ocean
bars; where the air is full of sunlight and
the flag is full of stars.
I shall emphasize that authority is not

just a word; it is, as John Todd sagely
notes, a fact whose manifestations everybody accepts or endures.' I shall follow,
in this connection, Yves Simon in recalling
that in every society, political and religious, public and private, necessary and
voluntary, authority is essential as a cause
of united action even in the smallest and
most compact community; it is necessary
also for the very volition, let alone the
attainment of the common good. Considered in its essential functions, therefore,
authority is neither a necessary evil nor a
lesser good, nor lesser evil nor the consequence of any evil or deficiency. It is, like
nature and society, unqualifiedly good.
Even Bertrand Russell, without theological
premises or preoccupations of any kind,
develops the pragmatic but significant contention that a healthy society requires
both central control and individual initiative; without control there is anarchy,
without initiative there is stagnation.", It
will be my task in this chapter to suggest
that without certain metaphysical and
even theological realities beyond these
superficial co-relative forces, neither the
individual initiatives nor the central controls are likely to stand up very long.
In accomplishing my task I shall be
grateful to many authors, particularly to
Romano Guardini for a brilliant essay in
which he questions the radical possibility
of authority in an atheist scheme of things.
I shall not, of course, even mention Guardini in my chapter, hoping that no one
will translate his article until after I am
dead; but I shall share with the reader
the things that I shall have stolen from
TODD, PROBLEMS

Russell,
(1960).
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it, particularly those which indicate how
authority is bound up with the origins,
divine and human, of our being and how
contempt of the authority of parents, as
all other human sources of what we are,
grows fatally in proportion as our recognition of the mystery of creation and the
fact of God grows more and more agnostic, however sentimental, and finally
atheist.
But I shall develop this important point
by borrowing again from Father Bernard
Hlring, who, writing of the mutual interplay of conscience and authority, points
out how conscience instinctively seeks
the guidance of authority and presupposes
its existence, even as genuine authority
by its very nature postulates the existence
and freedom of conscience; authority cannot exist, function or accomplish its
divinely appointed purposes save in a
moral universe where conscience is alive
and at work.
Then I shall use John Todd's introductory essay in Problems of Authority
for points for meditation on the origins
of authority. This reminds us not only
that both authority and obedience presuppose conscience, but that both are
related to the most intimate and profound
notion of being itself. Todd, perceiving
that the being of creatures is itself relational, traces the nature and claims of
authority from the very origins and authors of our being, finding that the ultimate meaning of authority is to be found
in the reality conveyed by the word
"author."
This is the same point, philosophical and
semantic, that Romano Guardini makes.
It involves the mystery of creation and the
meaning which that mystery gives to the
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authority of God; it suggests the limited
but analogous nature of human authority,
limited because all human authority is
devoid of that character of absolute authorship which belongs to God alone;
analogous, however, because men can be
the "authors" who increase or develop
(augere) the growth of that to which God
has given existence.
Creation does not mean for many of
our fellow men what it does for us in
the Church; neither, therefore, does authority. But for those in the Church, the
concept of authority on whatever level
we encounter it will be shaped and hallowed by the mystery of creation, directly
and fully in what pertains to God, analogously and proportionately in what pertains
to anyone less than God. Christian doctrine will bring us to see that human
authority is a phenomenon and service
whose origin is in God's creative act.
Everyone who exercises authority is invested therewith by God and will have to
answer to God for the use he makes of it.
For this reason, it is established Christian doctrine that one who holds authority
stands to his subjects in the place of God.
But this must be understood in its most
positive and fruitful sense; it must not be
limited to meaning that the superior, natural or religious, only represents the authority of God in any merely negative or
inhibiting sense. Understood as God, who
works through the constitution of nature
and the dispensations of grace, must intend it for the building up of His Kingdom,
authority, communicated to others by
God, must mean that he who holds it
represents divine love not less than divine
authority, divine mercy not less than
divine justice and, in sum, the life-giving
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power of God. 7
This means that authority is not only
established to regulate, to order, to control and, on occasion, to forbid, all in
analogy to God; it means also what is
usually much more important and urgent,
namely, that authority is given to inspire
and to encourage the initiatives of others,
as does God by His grace; to coordinate
the purposeful lives, strivings, aspirations,
undertakings and energies of others, to
press forward, leading, directing and challenging others, as God, by His grace and
through the voice of conscience, is constantly calling to new levels of excellence
those subject to His sway and responsible
to His authority, even as He sometimes,
by a grace or a rebuke of conscience, dissuades, prohibits or overrules them.
Human authority needs always the
spiritual disciplines and moral restraints
that reason and revelation both inculcate;
those who hold authority must, for their
own salvation's sake, be mindful that they
are, in themselves, not only the equals but
the least of the brethren: "Each of you
must have the humility to think others
better men than himself, and study the
welfare of others, not his own. Yours is
to be the same mind which Christ Jesus
showed. . . ...(Phil. 2, 3-7).
But while humility is essential to the
salvation of one who holds authority, it
is not enough for the achievement of that
perfection of individuals and society for
the service of which authority is given.
These divine purposes require that human
authority be not only Christ-like in humility but somehow God-like in its full and

positive use of office to lead; Christ emptied Himself and became the equal of
slaves, but not that they might remain
slaves but that by adding His powers to
their deepest desires, He might lift them
to a level a little less than the angels,
crowning them with glory and honor, giving them rule over God's handiwork. This
is the purpose and office of authority, not
contradiction and restraint only.
At this point we should note how the
modern Popes have clearly conceived their
office as involving authority not merely
to rebuke error and admonish the erring,
but to proclaim truth and to inspire all
who seek it. They have seen authority as
obliging them to provide intellectual leadership, spiritual direction, effective example and indefatigable challenge to all
who acknowledge Peter's authority and
depend upon it for positive leadership as
well as negative guidance in the battles
for truth and goodness to which their
consciences summon them. Father Congar can, as a result, happily write:
In the nineteenth century, Romanticist
literature, and often history also, had
spread the idea that power and the holding of very high office offered an opportunity for greater enjoyment, for complete freedom to do as one liked and for
helping oneself. The Popes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and with
them, the whole body of the bishops, have
stood before the eyes of the whole world
as men for whom power is responsibility
and authority service.8
Nor can it be otherwise once it is
recognized, as it must be, that authority
in the Church is always a relative thing,
a means necessary, under the present dispensation, to an end which is Love. In-

7Corbishley, Power and Authority, The Way,

October, 1963, pp. 285-93.
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deed, it is only in the Church that we can
speak of authority as the servant of Love,
rather than Justice, of which authority
must elsewhere be the instrument. This
is what Monsignor Journet means when
he writes:
The order of jurisdiction, necessary and
of divine origin though it is, is not the
noblest or most divine thing in the Church.
All its greatness is derived from its purpose which is to be the servant of Love.
'Peter,' Cajetan writes, 'is the minister of
the Church, not because he uses his power
to serve her.' Did not our Lord himself
say that he had come to serve? When
then the Pope declares that he is the
servant of the servants of God, he is
telling the truth. But the Church is
greater and nobler than what exists for
its sake. The Papacy is for the Church,
not vice versa. It is therefore true that
the Pope is not a master but a servant,
and that the Church, absolutely speaking,
is more excellent and nobler than he, although, from the standpoint of jurisdiction,
he is her head.
Not for nothing did Our Lord link His
conferring of jurisdiction to Peter's threefold declaration of love for Christ and
therefore for the flock that he must serve.
Not for nothing must the Pope, the Sovereign Pontiff, sign himself the servant of
the servants of God.
By this time, my gentle reader will
require of my book a chapter explaining
how it came to pass that conscience and
authority, the concepts of which are so
interrelated and the functions of which
appear, theoretically at least, so harmoniously reconciled in Church doctrine, have
often grown so far apart as to find themselves so often antagonists, almost antinomies, in so much history, literature and
private speculation.
This chapter will require a review of
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the political, cultural and scientific forces
which have influenced, for better or for
worse, the minds of Christians and altered
sometimes the accent, if not the voice, of
the Church herself through the centuries
since Christianity came out of the catacombs and entered the mainstream of
human history, sometimes to influence the
direction of that stream, sometimes to be
influenced by it or even swept along
briefly within it. Then our chapter will
seek to reconstruct if not the history of
the primitive Church, at least some recollection of what must have been its mood
when it was still so close to the unifying
person of the Risen Christ that its unity
was still that of brethren in a close-knit
family community of which God was the
Father, Christ the elder Brother and the
Church, whose prototype is Mary, was
the intimately known and loved fostering
mother. In such a family-community,
compactly one, personal conscience would
rarely have been the starkly individual,
lonely, sovereign and even defiant thing
that we find it to be, almost by ideal, in
and after the sixteenth century. Authority,
too, must have seemed quite different in
such a Christian community from what
it doubtless came to seem when the
princes of God's people began to dress,
to talk and often to act like the other
princes of t h e Renaissance world, the
ideas and values of which were so little
related to those of the primitive Christian
community, or, indeed, the Church itself
at times.
Perhaps as our liturgical practices and
theological concepts begin to express, with
refreshed clarity, the ancient Catholic attitudes and insights on other levels, there
will be a renewed understanding of the
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interplay of conscience and authority and
a moving away from the starkly individualistic concepts of both conscience and
authority which have developed in recent
centuries. In history there is no bringing
back the past, but in the case of the living
Church it is always possible and, indeed,
a duty to strip away the -dead accretions
of the past to reveal the essential timeless
nature of the living Church itself. Such a
stripping away reveals in the early centuries of Catholicism a vision dominated
by what St. Augustine called the Christus
Totus. Christians are in essence and always a community; then they even lived
as a community, wrote to each other as
members of a community, were martyred
as representatives of a community, prayed
as a community. The very fact of being
constantly subjected to possible outbreaks
of persecution reinforced this sense of
the community; it should still. Even their
failures in the moral problems of life
were principally failures to maintain the
"concord and harmony" of the community;
they should be so seen still. In such a
community the conscience of the Christian
early acquired a formation which preserved it from individualism and moral
solipsism.
On the side of authority, also, the situation was (and essentially is) such that
Father Congar can write:
In the early Church authority was that
of men who were like princes in a community which was wholly sanctified, plebs

sancta, and overshadowed by the Spirit
of God.

The Church leaders were all the

more conscious of their authority in that
they saw it as the vehicle of the mystery
of salvation which God wishes to accomplish in his Church. They wanted to
be, and knew that they were, moved by
the Spirit, but they also knew that the

Spirit inhabits the Christian community
and in the exercise of their authority they
remained closely linked to this community.9
But consciences, too, were moved by
the same spirit; the formation of conscience was accomplished by a single
spirit through the shared teachings of the
single Mother Church, and this with the
result that although conscience was warmly personal, as the Christian conscience
must be, it was never sharply individualistic, as later influences have made the
human conscience and most things else.
To suggest briefly how the sense of
Christian community deteriorated, to the
great hurt of concepts of conscience and
of authority alike, I shall refer to a stimulating recent book by Theodore Westow,
The Variety of Catholic Attitudes. It
sketches what happened to early, authentic Christian communal and organic
concepts of every kind, doctrinal, social,
liturgical and moral. It reveals, for example, that by the eleventh century,
though the feeling was still common that
Christendom was still one and that the
Catholic faith was still the universal foundation of society, nonetheless there were
already many symptoms pointing to new,
sometimes promising, sometimes disastrous developments.
I do not have time to analyze all these,
but I can note swiftly the significance of
the feudal rivalries which pre-figured
national rivalries and independence. I can
observe the effect of these on the Christian community, even on the deep levels
of its doctrine, liturgy and morals. I can
imagine how the gradual replacement of
a land economy by a money economy
intensified each individual's instinct for
9 Ibid.

12
personal independence. I shall not, then,
be so startled when I begin to find the
sense of community growing weaker and
weaker in the religious literature of the
Middle Ages, so that finally the whole
accent of expression between, roughly,
the eleventh and sixteenth centuries, falls
increasingly on the first person singular
when ordinary people are speaking and
on the third person plural when people
invested with authority are speaking-a
very significant shift, indeed, from earlier
usages.
Westow cites a typical paraphrase of
the Creed, written in the eleventh century, and already set forth in the form
of a highly individualistic prayer from
which, significantly, the article about the
Church is completely omitted! Small
wonder that even spiritual life by this
same time began to abound in individualistic forms of spirituality, visions, revelations and mystical experiences. All this
prepares us for the later tendency to
emancipate conscience itself more and
more from the formative influence of anything but one's own insights, separate
graces and private judgments.
Westow acknowledges, of course, that
this fuller expression of the individual as
distinct from the communal side of the
human person is not without good effects in the development of human culture and those divine purposes by reason
of which all things turn out for good for
those who love God. But the passing
evil out of which came the permanent
good was sometimes evil indeed; it was
particularly hurtful to profound devotion,
to the authentic image of the Church and
to Christian concepts of conscience and
authority. Medieval and Renaissance de-
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velopments gave impetus to new branches
of dogmatic, moral and mystical theology
and inaugurated discoveries in psychology
which uncovered intimate facets of the
human person as an individual; this period in our history made contributions
both sound and lasting. But Westow
rightly argues that it was unfortunate insofar as it over-concentrated on the individual, over-stressing the importance of
purely individual experiences and emotions and leading to an individual sensitiveness, with complications unsettling to
the delicate balance of society as well as
that of the person.
All this threatened to dissolve the
sense of the human community; it had
already weakened the very sense of membership in the Church, tending as it did
to turn religion into a wholly private affair. It made the ordinary man chafe under the guidance of authority and it
tempted him to excessive confidence in
his own spiritual strength apart from the
Communion of Saints in the company of
the Church. In terms of conscience, it
accounts for the total difference between
the Catholic position of St. Joan, even as
late as the fifteenth century, and the completely Protestant position of Luther only
a century later.
What happened in later history explains the dismay of a present day Anglican scholar over what has happened to
the New Testament concept of conscience
not only in modern society, but in the
Church as he knows it. In his book
Conscience in the New Testament, the
Kaye Prize Essay for 1955, Professor
C.A. Pierce contends that it is one thing
to teach that conscience is inviolable and
that no authority would be justified in
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overruling it when it speaks out against
an action or command which alerts it to
protest, but that it is something quite different to suppose that conscience is infallible. He protests when the Church
offers men no better guidance than "act
according to conscience" she is abdicating the office to which she is appointed
and is apostate to the first article of her
Creed, i.e., Jesus is Lord. He contends
that the word conscience has been so
torn out of its Christian context that in
any conflict between conscience and
Christ Himself, the modern opinion
would make Christ come out second
best!' 0
Reflection on this aspect of what has
happened to the concept of conscience in
modern times adds depth to the contention of Lord Acton that the Reformation
turned out to be, in many respects, a
movement against the freedom of conscience. It often left conscience subject
to a new authority, the arbitrary initiative
of a prince who might differ in religion
from all his subjects; in any case, it left
10 The

Anglican

scholar's

protest against the

dangers of a subjectivist appeal to the individual conscience are seconded with strong support from Catholic sources, of course. Father
Karl Rahner is quoted by Cahal Daly as chiding confessors and directors of conscience who
abdicate from their role of direction by telling
penitents to "follow their own conscience."
"As if," he goes on, "the penitent were not

precisely asking, and rightly asking, which of
the thousand voices of his conscience is the
authentic voice of God." It is not ultimately
before one's conscience but before God that
one is responsible. "And when is the voice of
God more easy to recognize than when He
speaks through the mouth of His Church? It
is indeed only when the judgment of conscience coincides with this word that one can
be sure of hearing truly the voice of conscience
rather than the voice of one's own culpable
self-deception."

the individual conscience without objective religious rudder in a turbulent sea of
multiplying moral crises which has shattered, in the name of several "Christian
consciences," the moral consensus of a
Christian community which had already
been shattered by the princes of this
world in its social structure and is, therefore, now doubly removed from the original Total Christ who ruled the consciences and refined the authority of the
original Christian community.
As a result, not all the rhetoric which
has extolled the sovereignty of the modern personal conscience can cover the
pathetic moral state in which it has so
often left individuals. This rhetoric has,
moreover, blinded us to the ugly face that
exaggerated sense of the autonomy of individual conscience can give those whose
consciences become not only the norm
of their own moral lives but also their
putative title to dominate the lives of
others. I think it likely that, as a matter
of relative statistics, there have probably
been more hearts broken and hopes frustrated by the demands of someone else's
"righteous conscience" than by the demands of public authority, especially
when that someone else, in the name of
conscience, has been demanding his way
(or hers) rather than permit sons or
daughters to do what every other voice
of God and nature suggested that they
should do.
For example: more than once in my
life I have seen the look of implacable
refusal or unbending rejection on the face
of duly appointed authority; I have seen
it in the movies and in the paintings
which tell the tragedies of those who
have suffered for conscience's sake at the
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hands of authority. But in none of these
have I seen colder fanaticism or more
corpse-like absence of the living breath
of Charity than that which I remember
on one face, typical of thousands, the lips
of which hissed at me, in the name of
conscience, all the reasons why its owner
would not permit his daughter to marry
a man whom only he despised, for reasons which he alone could perceive. But
how, in the climate of our times, could a
mere bishop urge considerations of humanity or experience, of the mind or
heart of the Church, let alone of romance,
against the self-righteous declaration:
"Bishop, will you dare to tell me that the
Catholic Church expects me to change a
decision I have made in the light of my
conscience?"
So, too, when we are told, with what
is obviously intended to be high-mindedness, that a man in public office will follow his sovereign individual conscience,
heedless of any other voice, when making decisions affecting public policy and
the lives, deaths or coming to birth of
millions, we do well to remember the
dread effects that like lonely consciences
have sometimes had in history. One of
the greatest exponents of the "I and God"
sense of conscience was Oliver Cromwell.
I can well imagine the people of Drogheda gladly preferring that the decision
as to their fate depend on the common
counsel of almost any commission, provided it included one or two people responsive to Natural Law, to fundamental
decencies and the general teaching of the
Church, rather than that it depend on the
sovereign, majestic, righteous but totally
mistaken individual conscience of Oliver
Cromwell-or, for that matter, any other
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individual, high or low.
Individual conscience is not always on
the side of freedom, nor of life, nor of
God, nor of man; "modern conscience"
can mean moral solipsism, the arrogance
and arbitrariness of which can be more
horrendous, because more inaccessible to
protest, than almost any despotism and
certainly than any duly constituted authority which must function under written law-civil or canon.
Further, reflection on the deterioration
of the sense of Christian community and
the affect of this on both conscience and
authority makes welcome the assurance
of Westow-an assurance that all who
live in these exciting years of the Council
deeply feel-that we are on the threshold
of a new era of human and of Church
history. In this era the concepts of both
conscience and authority hopefully will
be revitalized and reconciled anew within
the Church, where alone they can achieve
that synthesis which enables both to serve
the person, the image of God in creation.
This fresh vision, both of human history
and of the Church, is characterized by an
awareness of the human person as being
not exclusively communal nor exclusively
individual, but both; it sees the person as
being responsible simultaneously for himself and for his society and as one who
must, therefore, have the full resources of
enlightened conscience and responsible
authority to guide him. In such a vision,
personal morality is not centered on self,
nor on society, but on both at once within, again, that Christus Totus of which
Augustine spoke and of which the Church
is at once the means, the instrument and
the Other Self in history.
Within the Church, freshly appreciated
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and newly loved, those who hold authority will be more sensitive to the nature of their offices and what must be
their spirit. In this new mood men may
welcome more perceptively that formation of the enlightened conscience the
need for which is, by all odds, our supreme need as we move from the fragmented age of individualism into a more
organic society, consistent with and,
please God, better serving the human
person.
Accordingly, a chapter of our eventual
book must consider the role of the
Church in the formation of conscience.
This need is made the greater by recent
developments in Protestant theology, not
without side affects in the thinking of
It reveals itself, of
some Catholics.
course, in connection with moral judgments generally, but given the preoccupations of our generation, it has become
publicized chiefly in connection with
of contraception,
moral assessments
abortion, divorce and euthanasia.
As we have seen, the traditional Protesant concepts of personal conscience were
linked at least to the objective word of
Scripture, however privately interpreted,
or to norms of Natural Law, seen as
God's Law almost as Scripture was God's
Word and therefore as a control on conscience. But in the particular case of
contraception Father de Lestapis sees a
revolutionary change in the Protestant
understanding of the nature of conscience.
Father de Lestapis put it this way:
"The believer as he faces his God is the
only judge in conscience, not only of the
intentions which lead him to desire to
limit births, but also of the validity of the

means he employs for the purpose."
The moral philosophers who put forth
this "law of liberty" wish to defend some
binding force for moral laws; but,
as Father Gerald Kelly points out, in
principle they cannot admit an absolute
binding force covering every concrete case
because they think this would conflict
with the liberty of God and also with the
liberty of the Christian as the child of
God. Hence, while admitting that the
moral laws are good general guides to
what is right, some influential Protestant
theologians defend as the ultimate standard of moral conduct what they call the
"law of liberty" or the "law of love" in
the New Testament. This "law of love" is
superior to all other laws and may contradict them. The individual knows this law
as it applies to him in the concrete situations of everyday life, not through any
verbal formula, but rather through a sort
of divine inspiration received within his
own soul. In other words, in the depths
of the soul there is an immediate contact
with God-an intuition of love, as they
call it-and this is the ultimate guide for
individuals in their moral choices. This
direct word of "permissive love" from
God Himself is what the voice of conscience appears to have become in this
recent school of Protestant ethic; it has
had traces of effect or perhaps parallel in
the thinking of certain Catholics.
It is on this "law of liberty" concept of
conscience that Pope Pius XII commented in a searching and significant radio broadcast made on "Family Day,"
March 24, 1952, when he talked on Conscience and Education. Although delivered directly to Italy, the talk was a
commentary on the most urgent aspect
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of the general problem of conscience in
the present revolutionary transition from
an age of individualism to an age of new,
potentially good, potentially unfortunate,
communal emphasis. It is the problem
of the formation of the just and objectively justified conscience.
For Pope Pius XII conscience is:
that which is deepest and most intrinsic in
man. .

.

. the innermost and most secret

nucleus in man. It is there that he takes
refuge with his spiritual faculties in absolute solitude: alone with himself, or,
rather, alone with God-Whose voice
sounds in conscience-and with himself.
There it is that he decides for good or
evil; there it is that he chooses between
the way of victory and that of defeat....
Hence conscience, to express it with an
image as old as it is fitting, is a sanctuary
on the threshold of which all must halt,
even, in the case of a child, his father
and mother....
How, then, can one talk of the education of conscience? We cannot do otherwise, of course, in the light of the Incarnation and claims of the Word of God
in Christ and the consequent Christian
obligation in matters of faith and morals
to accept the will and the commandments
of Christ and to conform one's life to
them, i.e., each single act, inner or exterior, which the free human will chooses
and decides upon. But what is the spiritual faculty, if not conscience, that, in
each particular case, gives guidance to
the will so that it may determine its actions in conformity with the divine will?
Conscience, the Pope argued, must be the
clear reflection of human action's divine
pattern.
Therefore, expressions such as 'the judgment of the Christian conscience,' or, 'to
judge according to the Christian conscience,' mean this: that the pattern of
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the ultimate and personal decision for a
moral action must be taken from the
word and will of Christ. In fact, He
is the way, the truth, and the life, not
only for all men collectively, but for each
single one; the mature man, the child, and
the youth.
And so, the formation of the Christian
conscience consists, above all, in illuminating the mind with respect to Christ's
will, law and way; guiding it, also, so far
as this can be done from outside, freely
and constantly to execute the divine will.
This is the highest present task of moral
education and moral education presupposes authority, it is the first contact between conscience and authority, that of
the parent, of the teacher, above all, of
those who teach divine law-and of all
these within the Church. Nor is anything
more consistent with the traditional Christian concept of conscience. For conscience, as Father Bernard Hiring reminds us, since it is not an oracle which
draws truth from its own obscure depths,
by its very nature seeks illumination and
guidance.
God, the ultimate norm, the truth to which
every conscience must conform
always instructs conscience in accordance
with its nature: the natural conscience
through the order of nature, the conscience endowed with the supernatural
grace of faith through supernatural revelation. Just as it is not alien to natural
conscience to draw from the natural revelation expressed in creation and to learn
from the natural communities which correspond to it, so it is also 'according to
nature' for the believing conscience elevated by grace and steeped in humility
to harken to the word of revelation communicated to us in the Church . . . and

only one with a totally perverted concept
of the real nature and function of conscience could repudiate the infallible
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magisterium of the Church in the name

of conscience. Only a conscience which
itself enjoys creative plenitude of infallibility in its own native right could
a priori reject as contradictory every intervention of objective authority.
Nor are Catholics yet alone in their
sense of urgency concerning the role that
authority, and especially the teaching
Church, must play in the formation of the
enlightened conscience. The Anglican
scholar whom we have already cited, Professor Pierce, quoting a traditional Protestant source, argues appositely:
Dreadful consequences are derivable to
society . . . [from the use of] a plausible

word wrested from its proper sense. It
has been imagined that provided men follow the directions of their own 'consciences' they are justified in whatever
mode of conduct they may adopt, which
(as the term 'conscience' is now too generally understood) is

. .

. in other words

to say that because men are persuaded
a thing is right therefore it cannot be
wrong....

When men therefore talk of 'liberty of
conscience' they would do well to consider whether it is not, as the phrase is
now understood, rather a liberty of their
own making than any portion of that
liberty with which Christ has made them
free.
For this reason, Pierce sees the Church
as having five main duties, plus the resources for performing them, in connection with that training of personal "choice
and conscience" which Pius XII found
the urgent need of our civilization. He
sees the Church as bound to make herself "the best possible environment" for
the formation of conscience, a role of the
Church that is no longer served when the
concept of the Church evaporates from
the notion of Christian community to that
of an ecclesiastical center visited from

time to time for ritualistic observances,
conceived as strictly private duties. He
speaks of the spiritual manner in which
the Church must influence the secular environment in which her members have
to live, since this, too, shapes conscience;
he describes the teaching responsibility on
specific moral questions which the Church
has, beyond her general witness to the
truth, and how she must set before her
members, and anyone else who will listen, the relevant facts on these specific
issues, beginning with the great truths of
revelation and the doctrines necessary to
salvation, but including also the wisdom
of her own experience, which is the sum
of that of her countless members plus the
corporate insight that comes from her
immemorial dialogue with the cultural,
political and religious systems of all humanity. Above all-and here the Anglican echoes Pope Pius-she must proclaim
not only the teachings of Christ, but His
life-giving Person as the pattern to be
emulated, making the influence of everything Christ said and did and was penetrate the deepest depths of human
intellectual, appetitive, instinctive and
emotional life where conscience stirs.
Mindful that conscience can, while still
claiming the name of conscience, be
lulled, anesthetized, even deadened, the
Church has the duty to seek the development in all her children of a moral sensitivity so acute that conscience would not
merely react negatively to deviation from
Christian perfection, but impel positively
toward personal perfection, social reform
and the building of the Kingdom of God.
Greater appreciation of this latter office of the Church in the formation of
conscience would offset the temptation to
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pretend that the claims of authority to
obedience have so stifled the initiative
and freedom of devout consciences as to
diminish the effectiveness of the Gospel
and the Church. But Father Danielou
proclaims the authentically heroic understanding of true obedience when he
writes:
Christianity would have had greater influence on social institutions if we had
always had the courage to show that
obedience to God, as an absolute duty,
affects man's whole temporal, political,
professional and family life. If Christians
have not been more revolutionary, it is not
because they lacked freedom but because
they have not been sufficiently obedient
This is problem number one and it
....
involves fully relating conscience to authority, above all, the authority of God.
How? "1
The answer to Father Danielou's
"How?" is largely found in the study and
experience behind Cardinal Newman's
final judgment on the part of the Church
in the formation of a Christian conNewman was excruciatingly
science.
aware of the need for objective criteria
for evaluating the dictates of conscience
and no small part of his life was a search
for such criteria in what pertained to the
basic moral act, the act of faith. He
could not find such criteria in unaided
nature alone, particularly given the fallen
state of man which was, of all dogmas,
the one most clear to Newman. Neither
could he consider Scripture in itself an
adequate objective means to the formation of conscience nor norm for judging
its dictates; in Luther's protestation that
his conscience was "captive to the Word
of God" Newman would find the cry of
a sorry captive, indeed, so long as the

Word of God meant merely the letter of
Scripture alone; but Newman could find
no adequate guide nor objective norm for
conscience in tradition or the teachings
of the Fathers and it is the point of his
life that he could not find the rule of conscience in a National Church. The Universal Catholic Church, he decided, endowed with infallibility and teaching
channels,
divinely-appointed
through
must be the spiritual country in which
authority brings supernatural doctrine to
the direction of that conscience which is
the herald of the Natural Law; the Catholic Church alone provides adequate objective criteria for the evaluation of those
dictates of the sincere conscience which
the upright man is bound to follow.
It would take a book by itself to discuss all that Newman contributes to the
concepts of conscience and authority and
the relations between the two. Brother F.
James Kaiser, presently a professor at La
Salle College in Philadelphia, has written
just such a book, with special reference
to the relationship of these to Newman's
12
personal faith.
Mr. Garry Wills, in a book entitled
Politics and Catholic Freedom, is indebted to Newman for many premises of
his own argument on the role of conscience in the complex political area of
urgent contemporary interest which his
book explores. My hypothetical book will
devote a chapter to Newman because no
modern writer, probably no Catholic
writer at any time has shed such clear
light on conscience and authority nor
brought such tested practical qualifications to their doctrinal discussion. More-

11 DANIELOU,
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over, in Newman's day there had long
been rife the religious and political disorders resulting from polarization of
moral theory around individual conscience, almost in a vacuum of moral
solipsism. But by the same token, Newman's generation was beginning to feel
the stirrings of the renewed universal
aspiration and new social movements,
theological and political, of which our
generation is witnessing the developments
in Christendom and in the world community.
To these John Henry Newman was
sensitive, particularly in what pertains to
their relationship to personal conscience,
to authority and to the deepest theological
nature of the Church. On these points
alone, a good case can be made for
Bishop Robert J. Dwyer's description of
Newman as the "absent Council Father"
of Vatican II. Bishop Dwyer, noting that
Newman has been cited in the Council
more frequently than any other authority,
not excepting St. Thomas, finds his influence everywhere pervasive, especially in
problems associated with the development
of Christian doctrine. He declares that
Newman's spirit must inevitably be present in the Council's final decisions; one
prays this will be particularly true on
questions of conscience and authority.
My chapter on Newman will have to
point out that the English scholar, although the eager and unmistakable champion of conscience, was no partisan of
"modern conscience" nor of moral liberalism. Like C.A. Pierce among recent
Protestants and Bishop De Smedt in the
Catholic Council, Newman must include
in his defense of the rights of conscience
a repudiation of its caricatures and

counterfeits. He exposes the scientific and
literary efforts to be rid of conscience
entirely, the
resolute warfare

...

against that spiritual,

invisible influence which is too subtle for
science and too profound for literature.
...

As in Roman times, and in the middle

age, its supremacy was assailed by the
arm of physical force, so now the intellect
is put in operation to sap the foundations
of a power which the sword could not
destroy. We are told that conscience is
but a twist in primitive and untutored
man; that its dictate is an imagination;
that the very notion of guiltiness, which
that dictate enforces, is simply irrational,
for how can there possibly be freedom of
will, how can there be consequent responsibility, in that infinite eternal network of cause and effect in which we
helplessly lie? And what retribution have
we to fear when we have had no real
choice to do good or evil? 13
Then he sketches the present "notion
of conscience . . . in the popular mind."
The sketch is still life-like after a century:
There, no more than in the intellectual
world, does 'conscience' retain the old,
true, Catholic meaning of the word. There
too the idea, the presence of a Moral
Governor is far away from the use of
it, frequent and emphatic as that use of
it is. When men advocate the rights of
conscience, they in no sense mean the
rights of the Creator, nor the duty to Him,

in thought and deed, of the creature; but
the right of thinking, speaking, writing
and acting, according to their judgment or
their humour, without any thought of
God at all. They do not even pretend
to go by any moral rule, but they demand, what they think is an Englishman's
prerogative, for each to be his own master
in all things, and to profess what he
pleases, asking no one's leave, and accounting priest or preacher, speaker or
II

NEWMAN,

CERTAIN

DIFFICULTIES

ANGLICANS IN CATHOLIC TEACHING

FELT

BY

249 (1898).

12
writer, unutterably impertinent, who dares
to say a word against his going to perdition, if he likes it, in his own way.
Conscience has rights because it has duties;
but in this age, with a large portion of
the public, it is the very right and freedom of conscience to dispense with conscience, to ignore a Lawgiver and Judge,
to be independent of unseen obligations.
It becomes a license to take up any
or no religion, to take up this or that
and let it go again, to go to church, to
go to chapel, to boast of being above all
religions and to be an impartial critic of
each of them. Conscience is a stern
monitor, but in this century it has been
superseded by a counterfeit, which the
eighteen centuries prior to it never heard
of, and could not have mistaken for it if
4
they had. It is the right of self-will.
But for Newman himself, beginning in
his earliest Anglican days, conscience was
a cognitive and affective act of profoundly theological overtones, God-centered,
God-sanctioned, sensitive and responsible
to God above all else. It involved the
faculties by which man discovers God
and pleases God.
From Newman's Anglican sermons,
Brother Kaiser draws a total picture of
the great preacher's view of the positive
role of enlightened conscience in leading
man to the point where authority, especially that of revelation, can work on a
conscience illumined by grace to bring
one to the highest religious knowledge
and security.
This view goes far beyond the mere
"accusing conscience" concept. He who
faithfully follows the promptings of his
conscience, his sense of right and wrong,
Newman insists, will arrive at objective
religious truth disposed to accept it and
live by it.

''Id, at 250.
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from Newman's Oxford preaching five
propositions setting forth this matter so
vital to Newman. They are: (1) conscience consists in an habitual orientation
of the whole man to God; (2) conscience
develops in man a profound awareness
of the presence of God; (3) conscience
implies that a man desires to serve God
with a perfect heart; (4) this orientation to God and perfect service will be
manifested by consistency in conduct; (5)
finally, conscience imposes the duty of
habitual obedience.
It is here, in Newman's argument, that
conscience, properly understood, enters
the orbit of authority, not less properly
understood, indeed cries out for its guiding help. It is here, too, that we become
keenly aware of why the English Cardinal
of the Vatican Council I period would
second arguments of those in Vatican
Council I who argue that nothing will
better serve the case for the doctrinal authority of supernatural Catholicism than
a clear, unequivocal defense of the case
for the moral authority of natural conscience. How promptly would Newman
have perceived the implications, in terms
of the future of the faith, as well as of
the premises of justice and decency, behind that proposition in Pope John's
Pacem in Terris which the captious
seem disposed to debate as if it were
somehow rash or offensive to pious ears:
"Every human being has the right to honor God according to the dictates of an
upright conscience ... "
One of Cardinal Newman's deepest
convictions and dearest consolations was
that his own life -story ("I have not sinned
against the light!") proved how habitual
obedience to such an upright (even er-
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roneous) conscience eventually leads to
objective truth; that those who act according to the light of conscience are increasingly rewarded with greater light.
He saw evidence of this everywhere in
sacred history, but his reflections on the
case of St. Paul are particularly revealing
in view of his own conscientious attacks
on Catholicism during his Anglican days.
Newman considered that Paul differed
from other enemies of Christ in this, that
he kept a clear conscience and habitually
obeyed according to his knowledge.
"Missing the great truth that Jesus was
the Christ, he persecuted the Christians;
but though his conscience was ill-informed, and that by his own fault, yet he
obeyed it such as it was." Hence Paul's
progress from error to faith, his conversion from hate to love.
In connection with the relation of authority to conscience, the case of Saulturned-Paul was also instructive to Newman:
God speaks to us in two ways, in our
heart and in His Word. The latter and
greater of these informants St. Paul knew
little of; the former he could not but know
in his measure (for it was within him),
and he obeyed it. That inward voice was
but feeble, mixed up and obscured with
human feelings and human traditions; so
that what his conscience told him to
do, was but partially true and in part
wrong. Yet still, believing it to speak
God's will, he deferred to it, acting as he
would afterwards when he was not disobedient to the heavenly vision which informed him Jesus was the Christ) 5
Again, then, conscience and authority
not merely admit of reconciliation, they
demand one another.
2 NEWMAN,
103-04.
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The general sense of right and wrong,

which is the first element in religion, is
so delicate, so fitful, so easily puzzled,
obscured, perverted, so subtle in its argumentative methods, so impressed by education, so biased by pride and passion,
so unsteady in its flight . . . this sense

is at once the highest of all teachers,
yet the least luminous; and the Church,
the Pope, the hierarchy are in the divine
purpose the supply of an urgent demand.",
But however "obscured" and "unsteady" conscience may be, it is still, says
Newman, "a messenger from Him Who,
both in nature and in grace, speaks to us
behind a veil, and teaches and rules us
by His representatives. [It] is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ. ..

."

Hence au-

thority depends on conscience not only
for the holy exercise of its claims; it
depends on conscience for the very acceptance of these. The authority, that of
the Pope included, which would be unmindful of conscience or hold it in contempt would be suicidal; destructive of
itself; but the conscience, even otherwise
enlightened, which would not recognize
its need of authority, above all the teaching authority in the Church, would be
similarly destructive of its own purposes.
Newman's greatest apologetic task ultimately became to reconcile the natural
"aboriginal Vicar of Christ" which is conscience with the supernaturally established
Vicar of Christ in the Church. So far as
infallible teaching is concerned, this presented no difficulty; but in specific decisions in the practical order, including
those of a political nature posited by
Gladstone in his reactions to the decrees
of the First Vatican Council, Newman
concedes that "there are extreme cases in
which conscience may come into collision
16

NEWMAN, op. cit. supra

note 13, at 253-54.

12
with the word of a Pope," but he has
little difficulty establishing from Catholic
philosophical, theological, conciliar and,
indeed, papal arguments that in such a
case conscience is to be followed in spite
of that (papal) word.
Newman's detailed analysis of this
problem of possible practical conflict between conscience and authority is the content of his historic Letter to the Duke of
Norfolk; it is a classic contribution to the
all time literature on the question and it
remains required reading for any with
lingering misgivings about the direct doctrinal point defined in Vatican Council I
or the indirect political corollaries implied by Gladstone. (I once had a first
edition of Newman's Letter to the Duke
of Norfolk, but I loaned it to a young
Congressman from Massachusetts who
thought he should study up on this controversy in case he ever campaigned for
the Presidency; he won the Presidency,
but I lost the book!)
Newman's quip, for such it was, about
the order of the toasts he could drink to
conscience and to the Pope takes its
force from the fact that neither he nor
Gladstone were concerned, at this juncture, with papal infallibility or with
Church teaching at all. They are talking
about the moral freedom of a Catholic to
serve his country according to his conscience. This freedom of conscience,
Newman maintains, can never be in conflict with the infallibility of the Pope, because conscience is not a judgment upon
any speculative truth or abstract doctrine,
but bears immediately on conduct, something to be done or not done, here and
now, and in which, by hypothesis, the
Pope might give a specific order or seek
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to impose a practical decision which an
individual conscience found unacceptable.
Newman's conclusion that a positive and
clear dictate of a man's conscience regarding some act to be performed or
omitted must be obeyed rather than an
opposing precept of a superior is no less
orthodox than that of St. Thomas Aquinas in the same matter. It must necessarily
follow from the Catholic concept of conscience, as Newman mischievously quotes
against the British Prime Minister, defended by the Fourth Lateran Council
and by the celebrated Spanish Carmelites
of Salamanca.
Just as Newman's interior life prepared him to speak with grateful insight
of the role of conscience, so his career in
the Church prepared him to speak realistically as well as reverently of authority,
its divine role and its human, sometimes
galling limitations. No one has preached
more eloquently than he that "men, not
angels, are the ministers of the Gospel,"
and few have had more acute personal
experiences to add feeling to their preaching. But his view of the Church, as also
his view of history and the providence
of God, enabled him to see occasional
evil, including discomfort of spirit, as indispensable in the hammering out of
truth and the achievement of good. That
view the Cardinal set forth in a superb
description of the Catholic interplay of
conscience and authority:
Catholic Christendom is no simple exhibition of religious absolutism, but presents a continuous picture of authority
and private judgment alternately advancing and retreating as the ebb and flow of
the tide;-it is a vast assemblage of human
beings with wilful intellects and wild passions, brought together into one by the
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beauty and the majesty of a superhuman
Power,-into what may be called a large
reformatory or training-school, not as if
into a hospital or into a prison, not in
order to be sent to bed, not to be buried
alive, but (if I may change my metaphor)
brought together as if into some moral
factory, for the melting, refining, and
moulding, by an incessant, noisy process,
of the raw material of human nature, so
excellent, so dangerous, so capable of
17
divine purpose.
A book of reflections on conscience
and authority must perforce include a
chapter on the sentimental, political and
psychological pressures all but irresistibly
at work on Thomas More to persuade him
to take the oath so lightly taken by his
lesser (which means almost all) contemporaries.
Thomas More sat with his conscience for
fifteen lonely months in the Tower of
London, . . . isolated from the other
prisoners, forbidden his beloved books, deprived finally of even pen and paper.
But neither his conscience nor his writing
hand lagged. He scrawled last messages
to his family with charcoal ('. . . that
we may merrily meet in heaven') and
went to his death proclaiming that he
died 'the King's good servant, but God's
first.' 18
It is, indeed, a lonely picture, as is that
of the martyr to conscience always and
everywhere. But a devout humanist, like
More, understood better than any other
that the very nature of the informed
Christian conscience is that it never leaves
one spiritually isolated nor intellectually
alone. For the invisible wall of Christian
conscience closes compactly around its
possessor a host of rare spirits that no
prison wall can close out, "the choir invisible of those immortal dead who live
17NEWMAN, APOLOGIA PRO VITA SUA (1865).
18

Sign, Jan. 1964, p. 20.

again in minds made better by their presence."
John Lancaster Spalding described the
companions of Father Delp in his Nazi
prison; of Father Perrin in the concentration camp; and the spiritual company
of the physically isolated Thomas More
when he wrote: "If I am left alone, yet
God and all the heroic dead are with me
still."
Nor is the man of conscience without
joy. To no man more than Thomas More
could A Kempis' words apply: "Have a
good conscience and thou shalt ever have
gladness. A good conscience may bear
right many things and rejoices among
adversities."
For More illustrates (as R.W. Chambers' biography and Robert Bolt's play unforgettably demonstrate) precisely the
basic issues in any conflict between conscience and authority. Conscience in the
most exemplary Catholic sense was the
core of his character; it was the heart of
his sanctity, of his tragedy and of the
eternal triumph of this urbane humanist
of resolute, informed conscience.
But if my book gives a chapter to him
as the witness unto death of the things
we have been considering-conscience,
authority and both within the Churchit must give another to a not less shining
example of these. I refer, of course, to
St. Joan of Arc, whose memory for reasons historical, theological and perhaps
sentimental, I must cherish precisely because I am a bishop, that is: one bound
by conscience, charged with authority and
tied by great love to the Church. Jean
Guitton, the first of the lay auditors admitted to Vatican Council II, has promised a book precisely on these aspects of
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the haunting case of St. Joan. 9 No case
in twenty centuries presents so dramatically nor in such brutal completeness the
most extreme anguish of the conflict between conscience and authority. No others ever caught in this conflict, certainly
not Galileo and most certainly not any
usually cited as "modern Galileos," hold
a candle light of moral splendor to the
solar brilliance with which St. Joan illumines the Catholic concept of martyrdom for conscience sake.
Joan's testimony at Rouen is perlucid
evidence of the clarity of her conscience
and the correctness of its relation to duly
constituted authority, and all this within
the Church, whose true nature she perceived with a lucidity amazing in view
not merely of her lack of formal education but of the superficial understanding
of this mystery in even her most sophisticated contemporaries, her judges included.
It is precisely for this reason that
Jacques Maritain, in a moving recent
essay, describes Jean Br~hal's brief in
Joan's behalf as the most important
theological document in her rehabilitation
trial. Br6hal underscored that, for Joan,
when an order clearly comes from God,
no human superior can place an obstacle
in its way; her understanding of this was
strictly in the pattern of St. Thomas and
no badgering of judges or baiting of crossexaminers could shake her from her repeated affirmations of this premise of her
entire position. She said she submitted
gladly to all constituted authority in the
Church, to the Pope, to other prelates,
God being first served; she said that in
all her words and all her deeds she gladly
19
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sought to follow the Church, even, as she
understood it, the Church Militant, just
so it commanded nothing impossible, explaining that by this she meant only that
it would be impossible to deny what God
had commanded. "What God commands
(her very phrasing is almost that of St.
Thomas) I shall not desist from doing
for any man alive, nor for any thing there
is." In this, Br~hal argues, there is not
a shadow of fault; such words are morality itself.
Maritain then drives home the point.
It is impossible that the Universal Church,
infallibly guided by the Holy Spirit-(as
is no single prelate nor any particular
sub-grouping of prelates)-or that the
Pope acting as Chief Shepherd and Teacher of the Universal Church should ever
impose a commandment contrary to that
of God.
What, then, is the word "Church" doing in the adversative position to the
word "conscience" in which Joan was
so brutally crushed? Jean Br6hal, within
the lifetime of Joan's mother and those
who watched Joan die, gives the answer:
Among all the equivocations (in the questions put to her), one of them is particularly tricky and it recurs constantly
(in the trial). They kept repeating that
she should submit all her statements and
her deeds to the judgment of the Church.
So far as this might mean the Universal
Church (the Church itself) and the Sovereign Pontiff, Joan never failed to declare
her readiness to submit; but in their way
of understanding it, (to her judges and
accusers) the Church was themselves;
sed ad eorum intellectuln de seipsis hoc
intendebant ...

In brief, her judges did not think of
themselves as merely the human wielders
of authority; they thought of themselves
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as the authority, as the Church itself.
There, comments Maritain, in all its depth,
is the drama that involved St. Joan. It is
clear that the judges of Rouen and the
learned Doctors of the University of
Paris lacked an integral, living theology
of what the Church is, of what conscience is in the Church and of what
authority is in the Church-and, as a result, of what lies on the consciences of
those who hold authority in the Church.
Joan, untutored, caught the point of the
nature of the Church by an instinct of
faith and a grace of the Holy Spirit, and
she clung to it in spite of every threat
they made or trap they set. So, she pinpointed with peasant directness the human wielder of authority responsible for
her tragedy: "Bishop, I die through you!"
It is a precise accusation that must haunt
all in authority forever; but it is without
hate and so precise as to be without a
trace of anti-clericalism and, above all,
with full love of the Church. For Joan
knew that there was a sense in which she,
too, was the Church and when she appealed to a Church Council dimly she
discerned, I think, the Council called by
Pope John. With the passing centuries
we are slowly returning to that pristine
Christian understanding of the Church
that Joan, meanwhile had, "the Church
of the Incarnate Word," described in the
very title of Monsignor Charles Journet's
book ("so necessary for our times, too,"
as Maritain notes), to the implications of
which for conscience and authority alike
the present Council will doubtless bring
luminous moral, ascetical and dogmatic
insights.
And so, his close attention to the debates within the Council hall on the con-

cept of the Church should greatly help
Jean Guitton to write the book which he
promises to justify his claim that ours is
"the age of Joan." He means by this, I
suppose, that ours is an age of great
deference-must we not even say, in all
honesty, of sometimes mistaken deference
-to individual conscience; it is an age,
alternately, of excessive expressions and
excessive rejections of authority; above
all, it is an age looking for terms in
which it can express a dawning new love
for the Church, a love such, as I think,
as the twenty Christian centuries to date
have not yet seen and precisely because
it is sensed that in the Church and in the
Church alone are reconciled human conscience made divine and divine authority
made humane.
St. Joan has so much to teach us about
the claims of conscience, the pitfalls of
authority and why the Church, one with
Christ, is supremely to be loved, no matter what. Joan reminds us that neither
conscience nor authority amount to anything, in final terms, except as means to
an end greater than either or both, and
that end is neither the freedom that conscience claims nor the order that authority imposes, but it is the sanctity to which
conscience must bind us and authority
must serve. Joan reminds us that the
Church is on the side of conscience and
canonizes those who follow it; the Church
is on the side of authority and commands those who exercise it; but the
Church is, above all, the kingdom of
sanctity and to sanctity everything, conscience and authority and all else, is utterly subordinate.
Those who realize this have found their
way to the very heart of the Catholic
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faith; everything else is at the periphery.
That is why Bernanos, writing of the
clash between the conscience of Joan and
the authority of her judges, loses little
time on analysis or rehearsal of the evil
of the clash, but devotes his whole time,
as Joan would wish, to the lesson of the
good that hallows the otherwise harrowing business. Ours is the Church of the
Saints. Who, reading of Joan, fails to see
this and to crave to be at one with her?
Is there one who would really wish to
spend his life, like her canonist judges,
pondering the problem of evil rather than
dashing forward with her, the saint? To
be a saint, what bishop would not give
his ring, his mitre and his crosier? What
Cardinal would not give his purple; what
Pope his white robe, his chamberlains,
his Swiss Guard, and all his temporal
power? The whole vast machinery of
wisdom, experience, discipline, power
and majesty, is of itself nothing unless it
is animated by love and productive of
sanctity.
From the Pope down to the little altar
boy draining the wine left over in the
cruets, everyone knows that there are not
many famous preachers in the Ordo, not
many priest-diplomatists (though there
are some, mind you!). Ours is the Church
of the Saints. We may respect the Comnissariat Service, the Provost Marshal,
the staff officers and the cartographers,
but our hearts are with those who get
killed. Ours is the Church of the Saints.
Joan has other things to teach us and
these, too, Jean Guitton promises to develop in his book. He suggests that Joan
is not only the saint of conscience, but
she is specifically the saint of conscience
impelling one to vocation, a vocation
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within the Church, even though often involving tension with the institutional side
of the Church and, therefore perhaps,
with authority.
This makes ours "the age of Joan" in
yet another dimension, since in our age
the very sense of vocation has grown
tenuous and vague, almost in proportion
as conscience, for all the talk about its
freedom and its sovereignty, has become
more and more divorced from the voice
of God. A whole literature is growing up
around this subject, thank God, and its
emphasis is happily on the relationship
of vocation to personal liberty and of both
to enlightened conscience.
Bernard Shaw links St. Joan to all this
in one of the most perceptive sections of
the preface to his provocative play. For
Shaw, Joan exemplifies the conflict between genius and discipline, by which he
means the conflict between vocation and
institution as one aspect of the conflict
between conscience and authority. Jean
Guitton's preface to Maurice Bellet's
Vocation en Libert6 leads me to hope that
his promised book on St. Joan will make
Shaw's point profitable to our generation
in the life of the Church, in political society, in science and in the service of
every aspect of truly humane culture.
And so my final chapter shall provide
reflections on vocation, including the vocation of an organization like this, and
the vocation of publications like The
Critic. I think it possible that from time
to time in this quarter century of its existence The Critic and its publishers may
have had momentary occasion to run
afoul of authority, near or far, greater or
less. It is just possible that claims of
conscience have been sometimes involved
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in such collisions; so, I think it likely,
have been claims of authority. But the
pursuit of vocation, whether clerical or
lay, always presupposes dictates of conscience and sooner or later brings one
into collision with one or another form
of authority. Sometimes it is the authority
of God, impelling one to the vocation of
a needed but unattractive work. Sometimes it is the authority of parents, resisting a vocation to priesthood, to marriage
or to one of those harebrained ventures
which so frequently turn out to the good
name of the family and the glory of God.
Increasingly in our day it is the authority
of the State, seeking to regulate our vocations, sometimes through work authoritatively imposed (as in compulsory military service) and sometimes through the
impersonal requirements of the Planned
Society, rightist, leftist or secular democratic. This may easily prove the great
source of collision in an age of technocracy.
See how pertinent, therefore, to the
concept of vocation, which is, in turn, so
pertinent to the vitality of human culture
as well as of the Church, is this question
of conscience and authority. See how
important it is that conscience and authority be harmoniously related, but that
neither be annihilated.
In fact, not only must each be strong,
but the synchronizing of both must still
leave a tension between them. In the
dynamic society, and the Church must
always be such, there is a tension as well
as a harmony between the liberty that,
unchecked, could degenerate into chaos
and the control that, unchecked, could
freeze into despotism. Hence in the
Church, where the basic relations are in

order and both forces are strong, we shall
not regret the occasional painful stresses
and perhaps embarrassing strains which
reveal that the tension between individual
conscience and collective authority is at
work. Quite the contrary: we shall rejoice in the evidence this gives of organic
vitality, recognizing not only that the tension remains even after the two forces
are harmoniously reconciled but that tension is essential to the harmony itself.
This truth has its parallel everywhere.
It is symbolized in the "basic dualism"
that Curt Sachs finds at work in the world
of art where the to and fro of shaping
trends of perfection depends on two ideals
alternately acting as magnetic poles.
Sometimes this polarity and tension in art
is set forth in metaphor from physics;
then it is termed "static-dynamic." Sometimes the antonyms are described as the
Greeks expressed them in terms of ethos
and pathos. There is a tension underlying the harmonies of music, where the
order of rules is imposed on the spontaneity of sound. Biology reveals the
"balance of nature"; a certain tension is
everywhere in art and life or there is no
harmony and no health.
So for moral health, whether in the
person or in society, a certain tension is
as inevitable and necessary as we saw
authority itself and the impulse of conscience to be. It is in fostering and forming both, in the guidance it gives to conscience and the controls it imposes on
authority, with the arising from their mutual interplay, that Holy Church gives
glory to God, makes its greatest contribution to civilization and gives our vocations to each of you and, for that matter,
to the likes of me.

